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The literature generally focuses on a technomanagerial assess ment of largescale energy projects, highlighting issues of technical and economic performance, environmen tal risk, and the impacts of social displacement. Beyond economistic and technocratic analyses of impact and mitigation, we argue that truly comprehensive energy project as sessment should consider the con temporary and historical global contexts within which such devel opments are embedded. That is, we argue for examining the processes that give rise to energy projects, alongside consequences thereof. Such an assessment shows that bal ancing the need for large energy infrastructure with local and contex tualized solutions is a major chal lenge that, more than technological dynamics, may be a challenge of cultural dynamics. We posit that ad dressing such seemingly mundane issues is the radical solution needed for sustainable infrastructure devel opment, by exploring global drivers of the dam resurgence and discuss ing implications for policy.
Global Drivers of the Large-Scale Energy Infrastructure Resurgence
The Great Economic "Convergence"
The economic separation of early industrializers from the rest of the world during the Industrial Revolution, often termed "the great divergence," has characterized our global political and economic hegemony for the past two centuries [1] - [3] . But now, a histor ic change is taking place. A "great con vergence" is underway as less devel oped countries quickly adopt the technology, competence, and policies that formerly propelled the developed world [4] - [6] . United Nation's Human Development data shows that for the first time in over 150 years the com bined output of today's most popu lous emerging markets -China, India, and Brazil -is equal to the combined GDP of all the major indus trial powers of the north -Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United Statesrepresenting a major rebalancing of global economic power.
In fact, it is projected that China, India and Brazil alone will make up over 40% of global GDP by 2050 [7, p. 13] , and the "convergence" is far beyond these three [8] . Countries such as Mexico, Bangladesh, Tan zania, and Yemen and at least forty others have registered significant growth this decade and other break out nations such as Afghanistan and Pakistan had some of the fastest growth rates in the world over the past ten years. On average, non oil, nonsmall developing countries have seen GDP per capita increas ing at a rate of 3% per year since the 1990s. Today, the South produces about half of world economic output, up from a third in 1990 [7, p. 13] . While there have been periods of rapid growth for individual coun tries in the past, seldom in the last 50 years have we seen episodes where so many poor countries have simultaneously done well as in the decade preceding the recent Global Financial Crisis [9] .
The evidence is clear, says the UN Human Development Report 2013, that "the rise of the South is unprec edented in its speed and scale. Never in history have the living con ditions and prospects of so many people changed so dramatically and so fast. This change represents a global rebalancing far greater than that experienced during the Indus trial Revolution. The Industrial Rev olution was a story of perhaps 100 million people, but this is a story about billions of people" [7, p. 11] .
This change in economic dynam ics over the past decade is due in part to the differing experiences of Northern and Southern countries during and after the Global Finan cial Crisis of the 21st century. In the past, Northern countries served as the major importers of goods from Southern countries, such that as Northern economies grew or reced ed and as demand increased or decreased it would have a trickle down effect on the export economy of less developed countries. The 21st century recession that resulted has largely upended this relationship.
It is argued that in developed countries the crisis stemmed from, in part, a constriction of credit flow, which followed the burst of the hous ing and oil price bubbles caused by excessively low interest rate po licies from financial institutions [10] . Initially emerging economies "dodged the housing crisis that froze credit markets in the United States and Europe and that threw the rich world into the worst down turn since the 1930s. They never had to bail out their banks or endure the high unemployment and stagnant growth that historically follow finan cial crises" [11] . While the reduced spending and reduced demand from markets in advanced countries did eventually have impact on less developed countries, they were able to keep growing in the aftermath of the crisis, albeit more slowly, unlike most advanced economies which registered negative growth for many years after the crisis.
Economic growth alone does not automatically translate into human development progress. But Southern countries are not just tapping into global trade, they are also improv ing health, communication, and education services, which continue to support the growth experienced since the 2000s. This contrasts with contemporary policies adopted by many Northern countries which include austerity measures and cut ting of social programs posteco nomic crisis. Experts say that it is this combination of policies, popu lation growth and global economics that has allowed the middle class in the South to expand so rapidly [7] . In fact the UN projects that by 2030 more than 80% of the world's middle class will reside in develop ing countries and account for 70% of total consumption expenditure globally [7, p. 14] .
Global South's Growing Middle and Energy Demand
With this unprecedented improve ment in aggregate human develop ment scores, we are now seeing an increasing demand for basic servic es across the globe. Improved water and sanitation access along with reliable energy services have be come major Millennium and now Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) projects that due to population growth, nonOrga nization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) econo mies will account for more than half of the world's total increase in energy consumption until 2040, at which point they will account for two thirds of world total [12, p. 1]. In contrast, more mature energycon suming and slower growing OECD countries will see total energy use increase only 18% by 2040. This is compounded by the fact that energy consumption "per per son" is also predicted to rise as de veloping countries grow not only bigger (more populous) but richer, as men tioned in the previous section. As mid dleincome groups in these countries grow larger, demands for improved standards of living, such as for bet ter housing and sanitation, increase. As demands for housing, appliances, and transportation increase, ener gy capacity must also increase to produce food, infrastructure, goods, and services for both domestic and foreign markets, leading to higher per capita energy consumption. Whereas energy use per capita will remain flat in OECD countries over the next 30 years, EIA forecasts more than half the increase in global energy con sumption will come from nonOECD countries across Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America in the same time period, even accounting for ef ficiency gains [12, p. 8].
We are seeing an increased focus on the need for electricity services in places where it has not been as major a human development focus before. Infrastructure has moved from being a "simple precondition for production and consumption to being at the very core of these activi ties" [13, p. 2] . This energy "pivot" to the South has given rise to a surge in largescale energy infrastructure projects to facilitate industrial pro ductivity and consumption [14] .
Emerging Role of the Global South in Climate Change Mitigation
At the same time that energy demand grows sharply in the global south, there is also currently an increased global awareness of climate change and an international commitment to reducing emissions to limit tempera ture to under a 2 °C increase over preindustrial levels. This was recent ly affirmed as the Paris Agreement was ratified by over 140 countries [15] . In the past, world leaders have argued that rich, industrialized countries created the global warm ing problem with their industrial emissions and should bear the larg er brunt of emissions reductionthis has been a wellknown sticking point in past climate negotiations [16] , [17] .
But climate experts and now even officials from developing nations are saying "there is no way that global warming can be kept below the inter national 2 °C goal without dramatic limits in future emissions from the developing nations [because] under a Business As Usual (BAU) scenario, most emission growth will come from the anticipated increase in fos sil fuel use by developing nations" [18] . Experts find that approximately twothirds of avoided emissions will have to come from the developing world to meet the collective goal, which means that new targets such as the "High Ambition Coalition" target of 1.5 °C, which while mak ing very sound climate sense, poses particular challenges for developing nations [18] .
Given the threat of global warm ing and the yet essential nature of electricity to development, lowemis sion energy solutions that supply massive amounts of power are in high demand [19] . This brings us to the hydroelectric power dam, our large energy infrastructure technol ogy of focus.
Southern Investors and New Finance for Development Projects
Historically speaking, dams and hydroelectric infrastructure have always been on the international and national development agenda for modernization. Such projects were generally financed by interna tional development cooperation agencies and multilateral develop ment banks (MDBs). But the World Bank eventually came under strong fire for its lack of attention to the negative impacts of many of these projects, particularly regarding population displacement. The late 1990s were "characterized by esca lating debates over large dams" [20] and fierce discussions over a num ber of high profile cases such as India's controversial Sardar Sar ovar Dam.
Furthermore, cost overruns are ty pical and welldocumented in hy dropower finance. A recent Oxford study analyzed a sample of large dams built between 1934 and 2007 and found that three of every four dams suffer from cost overruns, one of every two dams had costs that exceeded benefits, and that the actual cost of dams is on average double their estimated costs [21] .
Mounting international pressure arose against dams during this peri od. The World Bank was eventually forced to pull out of the Sardar Sar ovar project after an independent review in 1993 [22] . Developing Asia is the largest re cipient of FDI inflow, and accounted for nearly 30% of global FDI in 2013. China has strengthened its position as "one of the leading sources of FDI, and its outflows are expected to surpass inflows within two years." Flows to African countries have also increased significantly. Between 1992 and 2011, China's trade with SubSaharan Africa alone rose from U.S.$1 billion to more than U.S.$140 billion [7] , [25] . Africa's FDI inflow increase is sustained in part by grow ing intraAfrican flow, from growing consumer markets. The share of investment projects originating from within Africa increased to 18% in 2013 from 10% in 2008 [26, p. 19] . This intraregional investment front is led by Transnational Corporations (TNCs) from South Africa, Kenya, and Nigeria.
The rapid grow th of Chinese outward FDI by both stateowned and private Chinese corporations was also catalyzed by deregulation. The Chinese government has been actively encouraging firms to invest overseas through its "Going Out" policy since 2000 [27] . 
A Critical Culmination: The Large Dam Resurgence
All these conditions combined pro vide the ingredients for a great re surgence. Increasing energy demand in the global south is being partly driven by changes in the global economy and together with increas ing focus on climate change mitiga tion commitments from the South act as a driver for lowemission technologies that deliver massive amounts of power -ostensibly in the form of projects such as the megadam. New investment op portunities for such projects have emerged from the south, filling the gap left by a northern MDBs financ ing downturn.
And indeed this is the boom we are seeing -globally, between 2005 and 2011, newly installed hydropow er capacity outpaced new generation capacity from all other renewables combined, driven mostly by hydro power development in Asia, led by China, where -as discussed ear lier -energy security has become a significant concern for sustaining its economic development [32] , [33] . Already home to more than half the world's dams, China has built 850 more since 2000, scores of these since 2005. India has added 296 dams since 2000 and together coun tries like Brazil and Peru in the Amazo nian basin have built or are planning over 400 new dams [34] . Indeed, new and resumed construction of mega dams is underway across the global south, from Latin America to Asia and Africa.
Beyond its own borders, China is also funding or building more than 350 dams around the world [27] . Emerging as "contender to the power of western donors" [29] , China is par ticipating in at least $9.3 billion of hydropower projects across the Afri can continent [35] [36] . "According to the Lao government's own figures, by the end of 2016 Chi nese companies had signed up for US$6.7 billion worth of construction projects in the country" -some 30% of the total earmarked for Laos' Mekong basin, making Laos the third largest market for China in the Asso ciation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) bloc [37] .
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) predicts that hydropower generation will double in China between 2008 and 2035, and triple in India and Africa over the same period [38] . At least 3700 major dams, each with a capacity of more than 1 MW, are either planned or under construction, primarily in countries with emerging economies. Experts find that "following a period of such relative stagnation during the past 20 years, the current boom in hydropower dam construction is truly unprecedented in both scale and extent [39, p. 162] ."
Compounding Effects of the Contemporary Dam Resurgence
Seeing the megadam resurgence through this lens of major contem porary global dynamics has critical implications for understanding the impacts of the development trend itself. For instance, researchers across various fields are noticing that not only has the pace of hydro power growth been unprecedented, but the physical and cultural geogra phy of where hydropower deve lopment is now happening is also un precedented. And this geographic factor is causing major compound ing effects on the impacts of our energy technology solutions.
First, the collective nature of these shifts has meant that much of this new energy infrastructure is being built in tropical and subtropi cal zones, where the global south's emerging economy demand is grow ing. These zones are also home to many of our most critically impor tant tropical forests, important for their global carbon stores, important as sensitive, concentrated zones of ecological diversity, and critically important for their cultural signifi cance as some of the last remaining areas of indigenous livelihood in the world [40] . Given the nature of where the dam resurgence is happening, there are enormous human, envi ronmental, and cultural costs both locally and globally.
New evidence finds that the re surgence of the largescale infra structure projects through new land acquisitions in tropical and sub tropical zones is directly and simul taneously inducing a resurgence of population displacement and dispos session [19, p. 1] . This is at a time when these very indigenous com munities are more vulnerable than they have ever been to the implica tions of displacement due to rampant environmental degradation, climate change itself, and urban migration. In fact some studies suggest that besides energy security or regional cooperation one of the primary moti vations for Chinese investment in dams in Southeast Asia outside of its borders is "to spare China's own rivers and avoid resettlement" since domestically the overdamming of Chinese rivers has already displaced over 23 million people and signifi cantly affected water availability [36, p. 313 ].
This displacement is exacerbated by the fact that tropical rivers are critical to global food security. In tropical rivers of Africa, Asia, and South America, rainfall drives a peri odic flood pulse fueling fish produc tion and delivering nutrition to more than 150 million people worldwide [41] . The Mekong River Basin alone hosts one of the largest inland fish eries in the world, and the over 370 individual dam projects proposed for the basin will likely modulate this flood pulse, thereby threatening food security for already margin alized communities. The main tool for environmental governance and licensing in countries like Laos is local environmental impact assess ment, which in most cases does not provide adequate technical informa tion for, and thus has had minimal influence on, policy decisions.
China itself has been heavily cri ticized for lax environmental and social impact assessment standards at home. For instance, over 300 000 deaths have been reported due to dam failure in China, and it is believed that the devastating 2008 Sichuan earthquake was triggered by the province's Zipingpu dam [42] . Since 1949, 23 million Chinese citi zens had been relocated for dam construction, and 6.5 million of those since 2000. Meanwhile, the Three Gate Gorges dam was decom missioned four short years after being built due to siltation [43] , like many others, and data shows that dams in China underperform regard electricity output, due to increasing drought and water scarcity. Brazil is also heavily criticized for weak licensing regulation for large dams, and a poor impact assessment pro cess, that was further simplified and weakened in 2012 [44] . Hydroelec tric power is particularly damaging in the Amazon as larger reservoirs are needed to compensate for lowland topography. For this reason many Amazonian dams suffer from chron ic siltation, which reduces electric ity production, drastically affecting river ecology. Furthermore, season al flow Amazonian rivers means that many dams perform at only partial capacity. This lack of transnational basinwide assessment often leads to disjointed project development with exacerbated impacts [45] .
Second, hydropower's reputation as a low carbon energy solution has come under major scientific scrutiny in recent years. According to the lat est science, reservoirs in different natural belts are responsible for dif ferent levels of emissions. In many rocky regions low on vegetation and population, such as in Iceland and other northern mountainous regions, the production of electric ity from hydropower with temperate reservoirs is a net gain in terms of mitigating emissions from electric ity production. In Asia, Africa and South America however reservoirs inundate tropical vegetation that decays, releasing masses of meth ane and soil carbon that can repre sent a net loss for mitigation.
While estimating emissions from hydroelectric generation is still an evolving field, there is broad consen sus among the scientific community that methane production is a major concern for tropical freshwater res ervoirs [46] - [50] . Major emission pathways for fresh water storage reservoirs include diffusion of dis solved gases at the airwater surface, methane emission from organic mat ter decomposition, and downstream dam emissions from degassing at turbine and spillway discharge points [47] , [50] . Research now shows that among other variables, the geogra phic location of reservoirs has a sig nificant impact on the organic matter storage, water temperature, and sub sequent emissions through these mechanisms [50] . For instance, Fearn side highlights the example of the CuruaUna Dam in Brazil, where mas sive emissions from turbines and spillways mean annual greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions 3.6 times higher than would be emitted by the equiva lent amount of diesel generated elec tricity, and these emissions levels are more than a decade after the dam's reservoir was inundated [51] . Fearn side and Pueyo conclude that "emis sions from tropical hydropower in particular are often vastly underesti mated and can exceed those of fossil fuel for decades [52, p. 384] ."
Third, a major impact of the in creasingly available deregulated private finance has led to a prolif eration of projects that are largely managed outside the realm of inter national conditionality or regulato ry oversight. In 2013 the World Bank reversed its twodecade old decision to turn its back on large hydropow er investment, citing its improved impact assessment guidelines. The Word Commission on Dams (WCD) was established in 1998 by the World Bank and the World Conservation Union (IUCN) as an independent, multistakeholder body to review the effectiveness of large dams and to develop internationally acceptable cri teria and guidelines for their planning and operation [53] .
After WCD's establishment, the World Bank went from a low of just a few million dollars investment in dams in 1999 to about $1.8 billion in 2014. However this still amounts to less than 2% of hydropower proj ect investment today, given all of the other development finance avenues now filling the gap. Instead of act ing as a primary investor, the World Bank has stated that it now "typi cally acts as a 'convener,' bringing other financiers to the table [54] ." Research finds that this switch to private financing for projects with such massive externalities "derisks" megaprojects for the private sector. "Very often this means privatizing profits and outsourcing risks to the public [38] ."
SouthSouth investment trends noted above bode well for region al integration and set the stage for other forms of SouthSouth cooper ation, such as technical assistance and capacity development. However, the requisite institutional reform to regulate such development projects has lagged. Much southern develop ment financing is not currently tied to humanrights progress, environ mental impact standards, or demo cratic and participatory civil society stakeholder engagement. Nationally backed development banks such as the Brazilian Development Bank, China Development Bank, and the Development Bank of Southern Afri ca, or the Asian International Devel opment Bank, the very banks now sopping up the hydropower invest ment gap we discussed earlier, "have abysmal records in terms of transparency and in terms of social and environmental safeguards [38] ," and can be looked to for "alternative sources of finance that are perceived to be faster, come with fewer condi tions and are more flexible" [29] . In many cases the companies conduct ing feasibility studies are also the same serving as financiers, builders, and regulators of projects, which "results in a blurring of lines between these role[s]" and raises issues of transparency [36, p. 322] , [33] .
International guidelines have al ways been far from perfect, as the World Bank case study showed, but the reduced financial involvement of international institutions allows project developers to ignore interna tional concerns, with major implica tion since political attention often comes to communities most greatly affected by environmental risks only when larger national or international geopolitical forces come into play.
Defining Problems and Solutions
We argue that articulation of this confluence of global dynamics and their subsequent compounding effect on impacts helps to explain the fuller story of our large energy infrastructure resurgence, as well as our current dilemma. Local and global tensions are growing between civil communities and policy makers as decisions affecting resources, ecology, inhabitants, and industry are quickly being made with little public consultation or open analy sis of alternatives, socioecological impacts, or landuse tradeoffs. Yet as shown, these are the communi ties most heavily affected by dam related forest loss, displacement, and food insecurity.
Indeed, the activism space around hydrodevelopment has become in creasingly violent, with many high profile murders and kidnappings being reported in the past ten years. Ironically, it seems in seeking to provide energy, climate, and social security, those are the very same securities jeopardized and in many cases eroded through such infrastruc ture projects [55] - [58] . Literature on the political economy of energy tran sitions suggests that rather than safe guarding marginalized communities from depravation, largescale energy projects often serve to exacerbate existing social tensions and conflict, intensifying various manifestations of insecurity [55] .
Furthermore, largescale hydro power is often proposed as a tool for energy security, stimulating local economic development, or power export revenue through a lowemis sion renewable energy technology [44] . However recent research finds that national plans for greater ener gy security often overestimate the need for infrastructure and invest ment [59] . Rather, exploration of numerous contemporary dam con flicts, such as the Yacyreta Dam on the Parana River, along the border of Argentina and Paraguay, the Belo Monte dam of Brazil, the Tawang dams of Arunachal Pradesh, India, and the Mekong Dams of Laos show that the use of this winwin lowcar bon development "narrative" can in fact disguise perverse incentives of state elites for construction, and perpetuate the imbalance of power dynamics among local and global actors [29] , [30] , [60] . The modern day hydroresource conflict can be framed as a reiteration of resource conflicts past and ongoing, proving waterscapes to be a new frontier in the local resource commodification and territorialization conflict [61] .
Power dynamics and political eco nomy play a key role in determin ing the winners and losers among different energy pathways, and in whose favor the tradeoff between competing policy objectives weighs. In a stateled, investordriven, donor shaped policy context where state elites and international actors exer cise imbalanced agency relative to constituents, the interests of the poor and the interests of the environ ment can be marginalized [62] . For this reason many civil society repre sentatives and people from affected communities argue that the issue of land rights and access to rights must now more than ever be a core part of development planning, rather than sitting on the periphery. As such, the literature calls for increased focus on cultural politics -the institutions and relations of power among state and nonstate actors that govern energy regimes and the outcomes they produce [63] - [65] .
Returning to our initial discus sion of the global resurgence of the large dam, if we see the trend toward large dams as part of this complex sphere, the issue of energy supply quickly becomes embedded in more imminent issues of rights and inclu sion, necessitating critical reflection on our global, discursive defini tions of "problems" and "solutions." Not addressing these key issues can lead to inaccurate, nonstrategic policymaking and possibly lead to the assumption of false dichotomies between policy goals such as emis sions reduction and poverty reduc tion [66] . Highmodernist initiatives that orient themselves around prob lem solving without precedent of consensus on the very definition of the "problem" being solved run the risk of undermining their own objec tives by predetermining the ways in which the "problem" can be concep tualized, discussed, and assessed. In ostensibly solving problems of energy demand and climate change, the hydropower resurgence may per petuate even larger problems both at the local landscape and for global commons [62] , [67] .
In a World where Novel is Normal, Mundane is the New Radical
We contribute to the growing body of literature on sustainable energy transitions by placing the megaenergy infrastructure resurgence in the con text of the confluence of global dynamics that have led to its devel opment. From this perspective, we posit that truly sustainable energy futures will require more radical attention to the global dynamics and cultural politics that account for the powerplay among actors, and more radical attention to our definitions of problems and their solutions, as opposed to a focus on technological innovations and financing them.
Critical issues such as power sym metry, land rights, representation, and participation have persisted for centuries, but rarely factor into ener gy planning policy in concrete cen tral ways. The work ahead is thus to create formalized spaces for inclu sion of a diversity of actors in the planning process, and for the exer cise of rights to participate in that process. We suggest three ways in which local and international energy planning processes can be revised.
As Escobar's framework of cul tural politics suggests, [65] first is the need to limit cultural dominance in the state's key institutions, espe cially those that create and imple ment development policy and local institutions that control access to rights. Addressing cultural domi nance could encompass extensive legal reformation; the establishment of anticorruption legislation that limits political interference and pro motes meritbased employment and business contracting; and legisla tion that institutes regulatory bod ies for investors and local industries that are independent, transparent, and accountable to the courts.
Second is a need to create spaces for, and to support diverse visions of, rights and what the exercise of rights means [65] . Even within one river basin, ideas of resource, subsis tence, autonomy, identity, economy, and development can differ widely. Acknowledging and empowering non dominant biocultural experiences of nature is a move towards peace with justice. Importantly, enclosure through restructuring resource use can have the same impact as enclo sure through physical fencing [68] . So, seemingly inclusive solutions to environmental conflict that involve community management of forests, payment for ecological services, algo rithmic river flow control, or other such initiatives should be approached thoughtfully and through truly partici patory decisionmaking processes.
Third, while inclusivity is critical, the legitimate community of people who have rights to participate cannot be a foregone assumption in nego tiation processes [63] . Creation of such a community will involve con scientious attention to the diverse and more nuanced expressions of agency (political, ecological, and cultural) that are important in iden tification of stakeholders for public participation and involvement. An organized civil society that acknowl edges its own diversity will further support a broader representation in decisionmaking processes.
In their popular paper on the virtues of mundane science, Kam men and Dove themselves state that "the major obstacles to develop ing sound environmental practices are not principally technological, though expanding our research ef forts in that area is critically im portant. Instead, the primary stum bling block is the lack of integrative ap proaches to complex systems and problems [69, p. 12] ." Especially as largescale energy infrastructure and technology is projected to do minate energy planning policy in emerging economies, we argue that there is no time to ignore the pressing and yet often overlooked issues of prob lem definition, inclusivity, and po wer dynamics. Addressing these seemingly mundane, yet fundamen tal, challenges may be the radical solution our global society needs. 
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